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Abstract—With the evolution of computer systems, the amount
of sensitive data to be stored as well as the number of threats on
these data grow up, making the data confidentiality increasingly
important to computer users. Currently, with devices always
connected to the Internet, the use of cloud data storage services
has become practical and common, allowing quick access to
such data wherever the user is. Such practicality brings with
it a concern, precisely the confidentiality of the data which is
delivered to third parties for storage. In the home environment,
disk encryption tools have gained special attention from users,
being used on personal computers and also having native options
in some smartphone operating systems. The present work uses
the data sealing, feature provided by the Intel Software Guard
Extensions (Intel SGX) technology, for file encryption. A virtual
file system is created in which applications can store their data,
keeping the security guarantees provided by the Intel SGX
technology, before send the data to a storage provider. This way,
even if the storage provider is compromised, the data are safe.
To validate the proposal, the Cryptomator software, which is a
free client-side encryption tool for cloud files, was integrated with
an Intel SGX application (enclave) for data sealing. The results
demonstrate that the solution is feasible, in terms of performance
and security, and can be expanded and refined for practical use
and integration with cloud synchronization services.
Index Terms—Intel SGX, Data Sealing, File Encryption, Con-
fidentiality, Integrity, Secure Storage, Cloud Storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks and different cybercrimes are an increasing
threat to today’s digital society [1]–[3]. In this context data
governance and security is of utmost importance [4]. Reports
from specialized companies and government security entities
indicate a growing number of threats to digital data, whether
from corporations or users. Companies faced an average of
25 new threats per day in 2006, up from 500,000 in 2016 [5]
and 61% of CEOs are concerned with the state of the cyber
security of their company [6].
Nowadays, users are increasingly using cloud storage ser-
vices to keep their files and can access them from any device
connected to the Internet. Such storage services hold a large set
of data from various users, including sensitive and confidential
information, due to their reliance on such providers. However,
these storage services do not always guarantee or respect the
privacy of their users [7]–[9].
One way to ensure an additional level of security for users’
sensitive files is to encrypt such data before sending them to
the cloud storage server. One option that performs such an
operation is using a disk encryption system, which runs in the
operating system background and encrypts all information that
is stored.
This type of system has some vulnerabilities, which can
highlight the risk of attacks and improper access to data. One
of these vulnerabilities is the user’s password choice, which
is often weak and can be discovered using dictionary attacks,
default passwords, rainbow tables or even brute force. Another
factor is that most of the existing disk encryption systems
keep the encryption key in main memory while it is running,
allowing other malicious applications to attack and discover
the key.
Nowadays the use of reliable trusted hardware technologies,
such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [10] and
ARM TrustZone [11], has grown. An Intel SGX application
creates an isolated protected region of memory, which is called
enclave, where data are securely processed. Among the various
features provided by the SGX technology, there is the sealing
of an enclave data in secondary memory. This process uses a
unique key as a basis for the encryption, which is generated
by combining a developer key and a processor key, and is
not stored in memory: it is generated again to each request,
guaranteeing that the data will be decrypted only by the
enclave that sealed them, in the platform in which they were
sealed [12]. Another feature provided by Intel SGX technology
is the encryption of data in a region of primary memory with
a random key that is generated with each power cycle. This
key is known only by the processor and never goes beyond its
limits [13].
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According to the previous discussion, we established the
following two research questions to guide our research:
1) How to improve the security of traditional disk encryp-
tion tools?
2) How to decrease the user’s need to trust the cloud service
provider?
In this paper, we propose the use of Intel SGX features
to perform data sealing and processing in a more secure
way, since these operations are performed only inside an
enclave, which is supposed to be protected even against
adversaries with high privileges inside the operating system.
We implemented, as a proof of concept, an application using
the Cryptomator, an open source client-side encryption tool
used for cloud files protection. The Cryptomator was modified,
integrated with an Intel SGX application, in order to use
its data sealing feature, which is performed only inside an
enclave. With this, the data encryption/decryption processes
are performed in a more secure way, extending this security
also for the keys, since they are also handled inside the
enclave.
The main contributions of this work are listed below:
• The proposal to improve the security of disk/file encryp-
tion process using Intel SGX;
• The implementation of such proposal considering an Intel
SGX application integrated with the Cryptomator tool;
• The performance evaluation of our proposal implemented,
considering six different hardware combinations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides background information about the cloud storage
and disk encryption techniques, as well the Intel Software
Guard Extensions technology; Section III presents previous
research closely related to our proposal, in the field of cloud
storage security and the use of Intel SGX in file encryption;
Section IV describes the solution proposed by this paper;
in order to validate the proposed approach, three prototypes
are presented in Section V as a proof of concept; Section
VI presents the performance evaluation of the prototype on
six different hardware combinations; the threat model as well
the security evaluation of the Intel SGX technology and the
proposal solution are presented in Section VII; the limitations
of our solution are described in Section VIII and, finally,
Section IX concludes the paper and presents the future works.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section presents a brief description of important con-
cepts used in this work, such as cloud storage, disk encryption
and the Intel Software Guard Extensions.
A. Cloud Storage
Nowadays, more users are using cloud storage services,
either explicitly to keep their personal files, or implicit through
applications that make use of such background services to
maintain backups or history of user data. The benefits inherent
in cloud data storage are virtually unlimited storage, version
history for each file, and access to data at any time from any
device connected to the Internet.
But there is always a concern regarding the security of data
stored in the cloud, especially as the number of constant cyber
attacks intensifies. One of the most promising defenses for
the cloud is encryption, which offers robust protection in both
data storage and transit. Encryption is available in two main
security configurations: client- and server-side.
With server-side encryption, the cloud storage provider
manages encryption keys along with their data, and many
cloud storage providers use this method. This limits the com-
plexity of the environment while maintaining the isolation of
your data, but there are several risks of keeping the encryption
key and data encrypted by it in the same place. In addition,
the cloud provider itself can access keys and hence data in
plain text.
In client-side encryption, the user is responsible for keeping
their keys, accessed with a password, which is a user-centric
approach to keep control of the data. This configuration
limits the risk of external access to sensitive information, by
unauthorized entities, since encryption is ideal for confidential
data. Most client-side encryption methods involve encrypting
data for storage in a cloud service that does not support
natively.
The user can determine which data to encrypt and which
data to store in the cloud in plain text. The user can encrypt
only certain files, or create an entire encrypted file container
or storage folder. This can be done even when using server-
side encryption services, adding an extra layer of security to
extremely sensitive data.
B. Disk Encryption
Many people and companies have sensitive information
stored on the most diverse types of devices. In this context,
Full Disk Encryption (FDE) has emerged as a solution to
ensure the security of these information in cases of theft
or loss of devices that store them, since mechanisms such
as passwords and biometric blocking do not prevent the
storage media from being accessed when installed on another
machines. FDE is an effective method of protecting data from
unauthorized access, because it consists of encrypting entire
volumes/partitions or disks, ensuring that information can not
be accessed without the mechanism and key used for encryp-
tion. Existing mechanisms can be classified into firmware-
level encryption (hardware-based solutions) and kernel-level
encryption (software-based solutions).
Hardware-based FDE engines are called Self-Encrypting
Drives (SEDs), in which encryption is performed by the disk
controller and the encryption keys are not present in the CPU
neither in the main memory of the computer. In addition,
the MBR (Master Boot Record) is also encrypted, preventing
manipulation attacks. This type of FDE is present in some
specific storage media models, such as Intel SSD 320 and
520 drives, and requires a previous boot environment with a
screen available for entering the access password. According
to [14], some Solid State Drive (SSD) models have failures in
the encryption process, allowing the stored data to be extracted
from the drive without knowing the key used to perform the
encryption.
Software-based FDE engines are applications run at the
kernel level by the CPU, in which data and used keys are
stored in the main memory. This type of FDE consists of
intercepting all operating system (OS) requests and encrypting
the data before storage, or fetching encrypted data on storage
media and returning OS-readable information. Software-based
FDE do not encrypt the MBR, which allows manipulative
attacks on it. This kind of solution has been on the market
since the 2000s, beginning with the launch of Cryptoloop
[15] for Linux, which was the predecessor of Dm-Crypt [16],
released in 2003.
Linux based operating systems commonly implement the
LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) disk-encryption specifica-
tion. LUKS is a platform-independent standard on-disk format
based on a two level key hierarchy, protecting the master
key using PBKDF2 [17] as key derivation function, with
an anti-forensic splitter (AF-splitter) to solve the problem of
data remanence, that inflates and splits the master key before
storing it on disk [18], [19].
In addition to these, other disk encryption systems are also
widely used by end users, such as Cryptomator, that uses
a virtual file system to create a file container, where the
encrypted data are stored [20].
C. Intel SGX
Intel SGX technology compiles a set of instructions and
mechanisms for creating and accessing a protected region of
memory, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
application data. The first version of SGX was added to Intel
Core processors from the 6th generation (Skylake) and allows
an application to start a protected container, called enclave. In
this context, two significant features have been added in Intel’s
x86 architecture: a change in the enclave memory access and
the protection of application address mappings [10], [21].
An enclave is a fixed-size protected area in the application’s
address space, which allows a portion of the application code
to be run confidentially and securely, ensuring that other
software can not access these information, even if it has high
running privilege or if it is running within other enclaves
[10]. Attempts to gain unauthorized access to the contents
of an enclave are detected and prevented, or the operation is
aborted. While the enclave data are being processed between
the registers and other internal blocks of the processor, it uses
internal access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
access to these data. When data are transferred to main
memory, they are automatically encrypted and stored in a
reserved region, called Processor Reserved Memory (PRM).
Memory encryption is done using a 128-bit time-invariant
AES-CTR encryption algorithm and containing protections
against replay attacks. The encryption key is stored in internal
registers of the processor, not being accessible to external
components, and is randomly changed at each hibernation or
system restart event. Memory probes or other techniques that
attempt to modify or replace these data are also avoided, and
the fact of connecting the memory module to another system
will only give access to the data in an encrypted form [22],
[23].
Intel SGX technology ensures the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the data while inside an enclave. In general, when
the enclave is destroyed, all information is lost. To preserve
these information, SGX technology provides a mechanism that
allows the enclave to seal them using a key called Sealing Key,
so the information can be safely stored on disk. The sealing
key is a unique key generated by the CPU for that enclave and
on that particular platform, and it is not necessary to store it
for unsealing the data. Sealing and unsealing are the operations
involved in the data protection process on disk [13]. The AES-
GCM algorithm is used for data sealing and the AES-CMAC
algorithm is used for key derivation [22].
In order to share information, protected in a running enclave,
with other enclaves, the security must be ensured at the desti-
nation and also during the transmission process. To this end,
Intel SGX technology provides a feature called attestation,
which allows an enclave to prove to third parties that it is
legitimate, unadulterated and correctly loaded, allowing the
creation of a secure channel for communication between them.
Intel SGX technology provides mechanisms that enable two
forms of attestation: local attestation and remote attestation
[13].
Local attestation is performed when two enclaves on the
same device need to securely exchange information with each
other. In this case, one enclave must prove its identity and
authenticity to the other in order to begin the communication.
This form of attestation uses a symmetric key system, with
the enclave asking the hardware a credential, which should
be forwarded to the other enclave who will verify that the
credential was generated on the same platform. The used key
is embedded in the hardware platform, and only known by the
enclaves running on that platform.
Remote attestation is performed when enclaves are running
on separate devices and need to securely exchange information
with each other or when a third party needs to securely send
data to an enclave. This form of attestation requires the use of
asymmetric encryption, a special Intel-provided enclave called
the Quoting Enclave, and a CPU-produced credential called
QUOTE. The QUOTE credential is generated by replacing the
Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the reports generated
by local enclaves with a signature created using an asymmetric
key using the Intel Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID). To ensure the
security of the Intel EPID key, only the instantiated Quoting
Enclave has access to it [12], [13].
III. RELATED WORK
This Section contains related works that also consider cloud
storage security and privacy, and disk encryption using the
Intel SGX technology.
A. Cloud Storage Security and Privacy
The security and privacy of files stored in the cloud are a
central concern because such data are being delivered to third
parties. Several works in the literature present different tech-
niques and mechanisms to guarantee or increase the security
of users’ files and maintain their confidentiality.
One of the features widely used by cloud storage providers
to improve storage utilization is deduplication, which aims to
eliminate duplicate copies of repeating data. Deduplication can
also optimize the network data traffic by reducing number of
bytes that must be sent, but can also be used as a side channel
technique by attackers who try to obtain sensitive information
of other users’ data. In order to mitigate this vulnerability,
client-side encryption schemes are proposed that allow data
deduplication and audit while prevent leakages [24], [25].
Audit operations can also characterize a point of failure,
allowing encryption key exposure. To deal with this problem,
in [26], the authors point out that cloud storage auditing
scheme with key-exposure resilience has been proposed, but
valid authenticators can still be forged later than the key-
exposure time period, if the current secret key of the data
owner has been obtained. Then, the authors propose a new
kind of cloud storage auditing and design a concrete scheme
where the key exposure in one time period does not affect the
security of cloud storage auditing in other time periods.
A relationship between secure cloud storage and secure
network coding is also demonstrated by [27], what originates
a systematic way to construct secure cloud storage protocols
based on any secure network coding protocol. The authors also
propose a publicly verifiable secure cloud storage protocol that
support user anonymity and third-party public auditing.
Also, [28] presents a server-side encryption approach with
federation sharing for cloud storage using a hybrid envi-
ronment. An approach to split the data and distribute them
along different cloud servers is described in [29], to prevent
cloud service operators from directly accessing partial data.
The authors also present an alternative approach to determine
whether the data packets need a split to shorten the operation
time.
Hardware-based security mechanisms are also used to pro-
vide security and privacy in cloud storage services. In [30],
the authors describe a two factor encryption architecture that
incorporates the use of a hardware token. A proof of concept
was developed with a middleware that can be used with
any cloud storage provider that makes use of the OAuth 2.0
protocol for authentication and authorization.
In [31], Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are pro-
posed to increase the security and privacy of data storage
and processing in cloud/fog-based IoT applications. The au-
thors propose an architecture that applies authentication and
authorization for the participants, and cryptography for the
generated data. These data must be decrypted and processed
only inside a TEE application. A proof of concept using Intel
SGX was implemented and evaluated, presenting an acceptable
communication latency when compared to an application that
did not apply any security mechanism.
B. Disk Encryption with Intel SGX
Intel SGX technology has been used in a wide range of
applications and in several areas. One of these areas is disk
encryption, in which Intel SGX provides an additional layer
of security for the storage of sensitive files.
In [32] the authors introduce the concept of isolating kernel
components from the operating system into enclaves in order
to prevent vulnerabilities in certain modules from completely
compromising the system. Due to the restrictions of the Intel
SGX technology, the enclave can not be executed directly by
the kernel, so the authors had to include a daemon running in
user mode to communicate with a Loadable Kernel Module
(LKM). As proof of concept, the authors created an LKM
that registers a new mode inside the kernel encryption API
(Application Programming Interface), allowing to carry out
the encryption process within an enclave, that can be used for
disk encryption.
The proposal presented by [33] is to include the data en-
cryption within a file system based on the FUSE1 (Filesystem
in Userspace), using the Intel SGX technology to ensure that
the stored data are secure. File requests made to the operating
system through the virtual file system are intercepted by the
FUSE library and sent to an enclave, which performs the
process of encrypting and decrypting the data using the native
data sealing feature provided by the Intel SGX technology.
The paper [34] focuses on decreasing the chances of success
in a side channel attack on a file system based on the
Intel SGX technology. It consists of a library that has a
file system running within an enclave, and an application
running in another enclave making requests to that file system.
Communication between the enclave library and the enclave
application is performed through a queue of messages sent by
encrypted communication channels between the processes.
IV. CLIENT-SIDE ENCRYPTION USING TEE
This work proposes the inclusion of the data sealing fea-
ture, provided by the Intel SGX technology, integrated to a
Disk/File Encryption Tool. In order to validate our proposal,
we are considering the Cryptomator software. Cryptomator
works with file container encryption, providing the user’s
operating system with a virtual file system where data are
read and written elsewhere.
Cryptomator is designed to be used as a client-side file
encryption service and can work with any cloud data syn-
chronization software [35]. In addition, Cryptomator provides
the user with a transparent service by encrypting the files
individually, allowing the cloud storage service to maintain a
file update history. Another feature provided by Cryptomator
is directory structure obfuscation [20].
The application is divided into three main modules, namely:
• Cryptomator: graphical interface that provides the user
with control of the containers;
• CryptoFS: library that implements a virtual file system
and is responsible for reading and writing data within
1https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse
the containers, through the operating system, providing
the file system with decrypted data and encrypting the
received data before storing them on a secondary media;
• CryptoLib: library that provides functions for the en-
cryption and decryption of the files, which are handled
by the CryptoFS module.
The process of reading the files provided by the application
can be described in 12 steps, as shown in Fig. 1. These steps
are explained below:
1) The user requests the operating system to open a file;
2) The operating system requests FUSE for file data. FUSE
allows the userspace applications export a filesystem
to the Linux kernel, with functions to mount the file
system, unmount it and communicate with kernel;
3) FUSE forwards this request to the Cryptomator, using
the CryptoFS library;
4) Cryptomator requests the operating system to have the
file data fetched from the storage device;
5) The operating system locates the data;
6) These data are loaded into the main memory;
7) The operating system provides these data to the Cryp-
tomator;
8) The CryptoFS library sends the encrypted data to the
CryptoLib library;
9) The CryptoLib library decrypts the received data and
returns them to CryptoFS library;
10) The CryptoFS library sends the decrypted data to FUSE;
11) FUSE forwards such data to the operating system;
12) Finally, the operating system provides the user with the
decrypted file.
Cryptomator 
CryptoLib
Operating 
System
Storage Device with Cloud Synchronization
Virtual File 
System
Cryptomator
CryptoFS
User
1 2
3 9
5
7
6
810
12 11
4
Fig. 1. Workflow for reading and decrypting stored data with Cryptomator.
The data writing process is similar to the reading process,
but with the plain data being sent to the CryptoLib library
before, and then they are forwarded to the operating system
for recording in the storage device. The files stored in the
local device are also synchronized with a cloud storage service,
already in encrypted form, and a second layer of encryption
can be applied by the cloud storage provider.
In this sense, we propose to include the data sealing mecha-
nism provided by Intel SGX technology within the CryptoLib
library, in parallel with the existing AES encryption, and to
change the CryptoFS library to use this modified implementa-
tion. The proposed change ensures, through the use of existing
AES encryption, that the CryptoLib library can still be used
in environments where Intel SGX technology is not available,
thereby maintaining project compatibility with changes in the
main design.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
Cryptomator is designed to support multiple encryption
modes, without any of them affecting the implementation of
the others or requiring changes to the main project to support
them. The CryptoLib library is composed of a Java interface
(API), which describes all the classes and methods that each
encryption mode must implement to be used by the software,
and an implementation of the AES encryption based on the
described interface, which is called v1 within the library.
Our implementation consists of creating a new mode called
sgx, implementing all classes and methods requested by the
library interface, and changing the CryptoFS library to use
sgx mode instead of v1. It was also necessary to create a
C++ library for communication with the SGX enclaves, called
SgxLib.
The sgx mode has a Java class with 4 main methods used
by all other classes of the mode, namely:
• InitializeEnclave: handles the initialization of the SGX
enclave;
• SgxEncryptBytes: encrypts an array of bytes;
• SgxDecryptBytes: decrypts an array of bytes;
• DestroyEnclave: destroys the enclave when it is no
longer needed.
These 4 methods are only used to invoke the correspond-
ing methods within the SgxLib library. In order to handle
the communication between Java methods and the SgxLib
library, it was necessary to create a Java Native Interface
(JNI), containing the 4 main methods of the Java class. This
interface has the purpose of receiving the Java application data,
converting them to the C++ language, performing the process
implemented by the method and then converting its results and
sending them to Java.
Fig. 2 describes the process of sending and receiving data
between CryptoFS and CryptoLib libraries, which includes
two additional steps for communication between the Cryp-
toLib library and the SGX enclave. The shaded box indicates
a trusted execution environment (SGX in this case), where the
key is manipulated and the data are encrypted and decrypted.
The communication flow is explained below:
1) CryptoFS library calls encrypt/decrypt functions in
CryptoLib library, which contais AES and SGX modes;
2) In SGX mode, CryptoLib library creates an enclave
and sends to it each data block to perform the en-
crypt/decrypt process;
3) Encrypt/decrypt blocks are send back to CryptoLib;
4) Encrypt/decrypt data forward to CryptoFS library.
Cryptomator
CryptoLib
Cryptomator
CryptoFS
1
2
4
3
SGX Mode
Enclave SGX
AES Mode
Fig. 2. Workflow performed for data encryption and decryption through the
Cryptomator with the inclusion of data sealing feature provided by Intel SGX
technology.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the proposal based on the implemented proof
of concept, performance tests were carried out comparing four
modes of data storage, and are as follows:
• Without Encryption: Data read and write operations on
storage media without any type of encryption;
• LUKS: Data read and write operations on storage media
using native cryptographic mode in Ubuntu with LUKS
(Linux Unified Key Setup);
• Cryptomator: Data read and write operations on the
storage media using the original Cryptomator application;
• Cryptomator-SGX: Data read and write operations on
the storage media using the implemented solution, which
integrates the SGX data sealing with the Cryptomator
application.
For each mode described above, four different tests were
performed, two for data read operations and two for data write
operations. The tests considered the transferring of a single file
and also multiple files in sequence. For the task, the DVD ISO
image of the CentOS 7 operating system [36], which has a size
of 4.27 GB, was used as the data set for the single file transfer,
as well as the files and folders obtained when extracting the
same image, using the recursive transfer of directories, were
used characterizing the transfer of several files.
The RSync [37] tool was used to perform data transfer, using
-avhh modes for single file and -rvhh for multiple files
(directories as execution parameters). Further details on the
parameters used are outlined below:
• -a: Single file copy mode;
• -r: Recursive copy mode of directories, in which all sub-
directories and files are copied too;
• -v: Option to print what is running at the command
prompt;
• -h: Mode to display a better format to read numbers.
This causes large numbers to avoid using larger units,
considering a suffix K, M, or G. With this option specified
once, these units are K (1000), M (1000 * 1000) and G
(1000 * 1000 * 1000); with this option repeated, the units
are powers of 1024 instead of 1000.
A. Experimental Setup
Tests were run in custom PC, motherboard with a Z390
chipset, 16 GB 2666 MHz RAM, SGX enabled with 128
MB PRM size, running Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS, kernel 4.15.0-
51-generic. Intel TurboBoost, SpeedStep, and HyperThread
extensions were disabled, to get stable results. We used the
Intel SGX SDK 1.7 for Linux and set the stack size at 4 KB
and the heap size at 1 MB.
In order to measure the CPU contribution to the perfor-
mance impact of the encryption task, two distinct CPUs were
used:
• CPU 1: Dual-core 3.8 GHz Intel Pentium G5500;
• CPU 2: Octa-core 3.6 GHz Intel i7 9700K.
We also used three distinct storage devices to perform the
tests, each one containing different characteristics regarding
performance for data reading and writing:
• Device 1: HDD Samsung ST1000LM024, 1 TB storage
size, 5400 RPM spin speed, 145 MB/s maximum data
transfer rate, 8 MB buffer DRAM size;
• Device 2: SSD SanDisk PLUS, 240 GB storage size, 530
MB/s sequencial read, 440 MB/s sequencial write;
• Device 3: SSD NVMe M.2 Samsung 970 EVO Plus, 250
GB storage size, 3500 MB/s sequencial read, 2300 MB/s
sequencial write.
In all devices, an Ext4 file system partition was used. Since
one of the storage devices has high performance (SSD M.2),
and the highest performance in a data transfer between two
devices is defined by the medium with lower performance,
a RAMDisk was used to perform the recording tests, as data
source and target for the read tests. This way, there was no
speed limitation by the source or destination of the data.
Each test was performed 10 times, aiming to obtain the
average transfer rate in each scenario considered. Another set
of tests was also performed to analyse the reading performance
of data previously stored in each of the devices. The single
file reading and a set of different files were tested.
B. Results and Discussion
The results obtained in the single file read, on the three
storage devices using the Intel Pentium G5500 CPU, can be
seen in Fig. 3. The performance of Cryptomator-SGX solution
is higher than its original implementation, with the exception
of the hard disk, where the throughput was slightly below that
observed in the unmodified Cryptomator implementation, but
still very close to that. It is also observed that, in this scenario,
the proposed solution obtained transfer rates very close to or
even above those presented by LUKS, except in storage device
M.2.
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Fig. 3. Transfer rate reading a single file with Intel Pentium G5500 CPU.
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Similarly, the results obtained using the Intel Core i7 9700K
CPU, for the three storage devices considering a single file
read, can be seen in Fig. 4. In this scenario, the Cryptomator
application achieved throughput rates close to or higher than
LUKS, with the Cryptomator-SGX solution achieving better
performance than both in the three storage devices tested.
When considering the reading of multiple and different files,
using the Intel Pentium G5500 CPU, the good performance of
the proposed solution is also noted, except in the use of the
SSD storage device, in which a drop of about 15% in the
transfer rate was obtained, as shown in Fig. 5.
Using the Intel Core i7 9700K CPU, the Cryptomator-
SGX solution outperforms the original application on all three
storage devices tested, when reading multiple files, as showed
in Fig. 6.
In order to evaluate the Cryptomator-SGX performance on
writing operations, we repeat the previous tests, but reading
data from RAMDisk and writing in the storage device. The
first analysis performed concerns the single file recording
using the Intel Pentium G5500 CPU, with results presented in
Fig. 7. Analyzing these results, we can note that the transfer
modes using the multi-threaded capability achieved higher
transfer rates, relative to Cryptomator and Cryptomator-SGX,
which are limited to using only one thread.
Besides, there is a better performance of the Cryptomator-
SGX solution over the original implementation of Cryptoma-
tor, as the first uses the native cryptographic functions of
the processor as well the execution within the enclave is
from native code, written in C++, and optimized by the
compiler. Although the data transfer operations through the
JNI interface, for the communication with the enclave, and
the context changes, generated by the enclave entry and exit,
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have a considerable computational cost, these two overheads
are totally suppressed by the gain obtained in the data sealing
operation.
Fig. 8 presents the results obtained with the Intel Core
i7 9700K CPU in the same scenario: single file writing. As
can be seen, Cryptomator and Crypto-mator-SGX perform
significantly lower than the other two modes, because they do
not utilize the multiprocessing features available on the CPU.
The second data recording analysis considers several files
of different sizes, trying to identify the impact caused by
the file system when performing operations to construct the
references to such files. For this scenario, the files contained
in the previously presented ISO image were extracted, and all
contents were copied, as already mentioned. The results for
the Intel Pentium G5500 CPU are shown in Fig. 9.
Although the Cryptomator-SGX solution presents a substan-
tial performance overhead when using the M.2 storage device,
the transfer rates achieved were close to 80% when compared
directly to the original Cryptomator implementation.
Fig. 10 presents the results obtained using the Intel Core
i7 9700K CPU for multiple files writing. In this scenario
there is a considerable decrease in performance, both in the
original implementation of Cryptomator and in the proposed
Cryptomator-SGX, due to the single-thread programming
model used by Cryptomator. Nevertheless, the results obtained
with the use of Cryptomator-SGX show little difference com-
pared to unmodified Cryptomator.
VII. SECURITY EVALUATION
Another point that users consider when choosing an appli-
cation for data encryption is the security it provides and its
vulnerabilities. This section is intended to present the threat
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model, the security analysis of Intel SGX technology and the
security analysis of the implemented solution.
A. Threat Model
In the threat model we consider that the adversary aims to
access confidential information stored on the user’s computer
hard disk or cloud storage service, and that he/she has physical
access to these platforms for such task. The attacker can even
remove the hard disk from user’s computer and install it on an-
other machine with greater computing power, in order to apply
techniques to find out the password used in key generation,
or even the encryption key itself. In addition, it is assumed
that the attacker has installed some malicious software on the
user’s computer in order to obtain the encryption key through
a memory dumping, or to obtain the password used to open
the container by capturing the data entered into the keyboard
through a keylogger.
It is considered that Intel SGX technology works properly
and according to its specifications, and that the proposed
solution development environment is reliable.
B. Intel SGX Technology Security Evaluation
To build a system that is considered secure, the Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) should be kept as small as possible
in order to reduce the chances of success in an attack. In
Intel SGX technology, the TCB is composed of the CPU
and its internal elements, such as hardware logic, microcode,
registers and cache memory, and some software elements used
in remote attestation, such as quoting enclave.
In the implemented solution, the responsibility of the data
encryption was delegated entirely to the enclave. Thus, all
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warranties provided by the Intel SGX technology are in use
during data encryption. Some of these guarantees are:
• the cryptographic key never goes outside the processor
boundaries;
• the memory in which it is running, PRM, is encrypted
and has mechanisms against direct memory attacks;
• protection against external enclave attacks, even if these
attacks come from components with high execution priv-
ilege, such as BIOS or hypervisor, as specified in Section
II-C.
However, even though the Intel SGX technology have
multiple data protection mechanisms, there are some forms
of attacks that it is susceptible to. Intel documentation lists
technology limitations, specifying that SGX is unable to
prevent side-channel attacks, exploiting cache and data access
patterns, or physical attacks against the CPU such as fault
injection or reprogramming of machine code functionalities
[38]–[40].
The Intel SGX technology is also susceptible to the spec-
ulative execution attack, called Spectre [41]. The exploitation
of Spectre vulnerabilities to infer secrets contained in an
enclave is demonstrated by [42], where the authors show that
an enclave’s code execution prediction could be influenced
by applications outside the enclave, which could temporarily
change enclave control flow to execute instructions that lead
to observable cache state changes, and, thus, an adversary can
use to learn secrets from the enclave memory or its registers.
One of these problems was addressed by [34], in which the
authors propose a way to reduce the chances of success in a
syscall and page fault-based side channel attacks by using an
ORAM protocol in conjunction with the Intel SGX. But both
side-channel and speculative execution attacks are complex to
perform practically.
In addition to the vulnerabilities described by Intel, an SGX
enclave may be compromised in cases where the enclave
development environment has been compromised, or if the
SDK used is not the newest version provided by Intel through
its official channel. Enclave security also depends on the
developer, since the developer must take precautions when
manipulating data within the enclave, thus avoiding problems
with data leaks when manipulating pointers or calls outside
the enclave.
C. Cryptomator-SGX Solution Security Evaluation
In order to validate the security of the implementation,
the Intel SGX technology was considered as secure, being
validated only the change made in the Cryptomator.
When considering that the Intel SGX technology is secure,
it is guaranteed that the data can only be decrypted on the
platform where it was encrypted, or if the attacker is able to
obtain the decryption key through a brute-force attack. In this
scenario, we must ensure that only the data owner has access
to them on the platform where they were encrypted, so the
password used to open the container has been maintained and
is used to encrypt the files name.
In this way, even if an attacker gains physical access to
the media and the platform used, he/she will still need the
password to access the data. If he/she does not have access
to the platform, he/she will need the user’s password and
also the key used by the enclave to encrypt the data. In a
computer memory attack, the key used by the enclave will not
be available since it never goes beyond the processor limits.
However, with this attack mode, it is possible to obtain the
password used by the user to open the container.
This scenario also ensures data confidentiality even if the
cloud storage provider is compromised as data sent to it are
previously encrypted on the user’s local platform. The client-
side encryption, allied with the encryption provided by the
cloud storage provider, adds an extra layer of security to
user data and represents a new obstacle for the attacker to
overcome.
Due the Cryptomator software is developed in Java and
is separated into three main modules, an attacker can make
use of the CryptoLib library and implement its own solution
and bypass existing security mechanisms within Cryptomator.
Thus, a second security layer is necessary in the CryptoLib,
in order to authenticate the request to open the sealed data.
This proposal is set out in future work.
VIII. LIMITATIONS OF THE SOLUTION
The solution implemented consists in encrypting only the
data of the files that are stored inside the container created
through the application. Because of this, some limitations were
identified in the application.
Because data sealing adds 560 bytes per encrypted block,
since it includes authentication data (AES-GCM), the final file
size within the container will always be larger than the original
file size. Thus, the deployed solution always use more disk
space for the same files over other storage modes. As 32KB
size blocks are used, the ratio of file size increase is about
1.7%.
To perform the encryption process for each file, Cryptoma-
tor stores a file with encrypted name inside the container,
which corresponds to the source file. In this scenario, the
implemented solution could not be used to encrypt the name of
the files inside the container by an operating system limitation,
as Linux systems impose a maximum filename length of 255
characters for most filesystems and sealing the filename would
add 560 bytes to it. To circumvent this limitation, the file name
encryption was maintained using the existing AES mode, with
the key generated from a password chosen by the user. This
limitation eventually added an extra layer of protection in the
solution by preventing the opening of the container data, on
the platform where data were encrypted, without the user’s
password being informed.
The limitation that has been addressed in Section VI regard-
ing application performance is due to the fact that it uses only
one core for processing. Because of this, only one enclave
is used in the process of encryption and decryption of the
data, reducing the performance of the system. Another point
analyzed was the constant need to convert the data between the
Java language and the C++ language through the JNI interface,
generating a high cost of processing. Changing the architecture
of the solution to make better use of available resources within
the system will be the subject of future work. However, the
need for conversion between languages can not be removed
due to the need to use native code to execute the SGX enclave.
Sealing the data using the sealing key can cause inconve-
nience, since the data will only be accessible if the application
is executed through the processor that was used for sealing
them. One way to circumvent this limitation is to create a
mechanism within the application for secure data transfer
between two platforms on which it is running, allowing remote
access and data backup whenever necessary. If the processor
used to seal the data is lost in the event of a malfunction
or other occurrence, the data cannot be unsealed either, as
the sealing key is derived from a unique processor key. This
requires mechanisms to securely back up data to be read on
another platform or to use another key derivation scheme. Such
mechanisms will also be subject of future work.
Using sealing key also makes file sharing difficult through
the cloud storage provider. Such a situation can also be
circumvented by using remote attestation, or by using another
CPU-independent key derivation scheme for file encryption.
Finally, the proposed solution, as well as client-side encryption
itself, may hinder the application of current data deduplication
techniques, being necessary to deploy mechanisms in conjunc-
tion with the cloud storage provider, as described in [43].
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work proposed the use of Intel SGX technology for
data encryption in an open-source software, to add an extra
layer of security to data stored at a cloud storage provider,
ensuring data confidentiality even if the storage server leak
the data.
From the performance analysis presented in Section VI, we
have identified that, in most cases, the implemented solution
has achieved superior performance compared to the original
application for both data read and write. The increase in
performance can be attributed to the fact that the encryption
process was carried out directly by the processor, while in the
original application it was run through the Java Virtual Ma-
chine. When comparing the solution with the multithreading
solutions, we have identified that the implemented solution
and the original application have much lower performance on
high performance media, indicating a limitation on the part of
the project implementation.
Considering the security guarantees provided by Intel SGX
technology, which are described in Section II-C, the developed
solution offers an extra level of security by sealing the data
using the sealing key in conjunction with the user’s password
to open the containers. Thus, in an attack on the encrypted
data, the attacker will need to discover the user’s password, and
also the sealing key or gain physical access to the processor
used for sealing.
In order to avoid that a user’s password can be obtained in
a memory attack, it is necessary to change the software so that
the password is stored inside the enclave and does not leave
its limits. Just as it was possible to seal user file data using
Intel SGX technology, it can also seal configuration data. Such
change requires adjustments to the structure of the CryptoFS
library and may remove compatibility with the main project,
and it will be the subject of future work.
Also, it is possible to use a similar approach to [32],
encrypting the data within the boundaries of the enclave, but
using a derived key from an user password, and manipulating
that key only within the enclave. Such approach makes the data
decryption independent of the processor that encrypted them.
Also, the current solution can be changed to use the remote
attestation feature and allow container data transfer between
two machines running the application over secure channels.
Finally, better performance can be achieved by using all
processing cores available on the platform. Such implementa-
tion demands a change in the main structure of the application,
which treats the requests coming from the operating system,
being necessary to add the use of queues and parallel process-
ing, thus allowing one block to be processed by the enclave
while another is read or written to the storage device.
The source code of the presented solution is available at
https://github.com/utfpr-gprsc/cryptomator-sgx.
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